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The Future of Administrative Deference
ANDREW HESSICK *

If one looks at how law affects day-to-day life, administrative law is
arguably the most important area of law. Agencies make most laws and
adjudicate most disputes. Despite its importance, administrative law is very
unsettled. While the basic rules of tort and property law have not changed
much over the past one hundred years, that is not the case for administrative
law. There are still fights today over the scope of agency power and even
the constitutionality of agency action.
One reason for these fights is that agencies do not squarely fit into the
constitutional systems of separation of powers. Agencies combine the power
of the three branches of government into one body. Still, we need agencies
we depend on them to make policies and adjudicate disputes. At the same
time, they are anomalies, and we are still working out how to effectively
balance the need for administrative agencies against the need to constrain
their power.
Another source of tension in administrative law is that judicial review
has been the way to constrain agency action. There is a real mismatch when
courts review agency actions. Agencies are policymakers. Courts are the
opposite. Courts do not make policy; they ensure compliance with the law.
Nowhere is this mismatch more apparent than in judicial review of
interpretations by agencies.
The endeavor of judicial interpretation is entirely different for agencies
than it is for courts. When courts interpret the law, they try to give effect to
what they think the law actually means. There is some variation among
judges' interpretive methods. Some think that they should look only at the
text; others think they should also consider legislative purpose. But even
with those differences, the overall process is the same: start with the law, and
the law leads to the ultimate conclusion. For agencies, the process is the
opposite. Agencies do not start with the statute and then try to figure out
what it means; instead, they make policy decisions and then seek to justify
them under the statutory language. For courts, laws are the rails that guide;
for agencies, law is the box that constrains.
I.
• Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Strategy, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill School of Law.
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How courts handle agency interpretations is one of the biggest issues in
administrative law. Should courts defer to agency interpretations, or should
they review laws de novo? By deference, I mean that a court gives weight
to the interpretation rendered by the agency instead of just interpreting the
law independently. In North Carolina and the federal system, the courts have
opted for deference-though they are of different sorts.
In the federal system, courts have two doctrines of binding deference.
The first is called Chevron deference, which derives from Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. 1 It applies when a court
reviews an interpretation by an agency of a statute that the agency is charged
with administering. Chevron involves two steps. A court will first ask if the
statute is clear; if so, it will give effect to that statute-rejecting any contrary
interpretation by the agency. 2 But if the court concludes that the statute is
ambiguous, the court will treat the agency's interpretation as binding-so
long as the agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable. 3
The second type of binding deference is Auer deference, which derives
from Auer v. Robbins. 4 It applies when an agency interprets one of its own
regulations, as opposed to a statute. 5 The Auer test mirrors the Chevron
test-a court will ask if the regulation is clear; if so, it will give effect to that
regulation. 6 But if the court concludes that the regulation is ambiguous, the
court will treat the agency's interpretation as binding-so long as the
agency's interpretation of the regulation is reasonable. 7
Compared to the federal system, North Carolina law is a bit trickier. On
the one hand, the state supreme court has consistently rejected Chevron and
Auer deference. 8 It has held that state agency interpretations of the statutes
they administer and of the regulations they promulgate are entitled to great
weight-but they are not binding. 9 This is often called Skidmore deference
1. Chevron, U.S.A.,Inc. v. Nat'! Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 842-43.
3. Id. at 843.
4. Auer v. Robbins, 519U.S. 452 (1997).
5. Id. at 461. See also Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,325U.S. 410,414 (1945).
6. See Bowles, 325U.S. at 414.
7. Auer, 519U.S. at 461.
8. See N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd. v. N.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs,821
S.E.2d 376, 379 (N.C. 2018) (rejecting Chevron); Britt v. N.C. Sheriffs' Educ. & Training
Standards Comm'n, 501 S.E.2d 75, 77 (N.C. 1998) (rejecting Auer).
9. See N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., 821 S.E.2d at 379 ("This Court gives
great weight to an agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering;
however, an agency's interpretation is not binding." (internal quotation marks omitted));
Britt, 501 S.E.2d at 77 ("[T]he interpretation of a regulation by an agency created to
administer that regulation is traditionally accorded some deference by appellate courts.").
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in the federal system. 10 The state supreme court's adoption of Skidmore
deference should mean that the state courts should not afford binding
deference to agency interpretations, but that is not what has happened.
Federal doctrines tend to affect state decisions, and it is relatively easy to
find recent intermediate state appellate decisions-decisions that post-date
the North Carolina Supreme Court decisions-that state that agency
interpretations of statutes should receive Chevron deference, 11 and that state
agency interpretations of regulations should receive Auer deference. 12
Conceptually, the North Carolina Supreme Court's approach makes
much more sense. The reasons for deferring to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes are pragmatic. Under Skidmore deference, the resolution
of ambiguity in a statute is no longer simply a legal question; instead,
interpretation calls for value-laden judgments. 13 Agencies, more than courts,
are the appropriate bodies to make those determinations because they are
hired by politicians precisely to make policy determinations. 14 They have
expertise in the areas to be regulated and are better situated to coordinate
regulations across statutory schemes. 15 Agencies may also have greater
public policy initiative because they are not bound by jurisdictional
restrictions, and they can update interpretations more quickly in response to
changing circumstances. 16

10. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
11. Blue Ridge Healthcare Hosps. Inc. v. N.C. Dep't ofHealth & Human Servs., 808
S.E.2d 271, 276-77 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) ("' It is well settled that when a court reviews
an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers, the court should defer to
the agency's interpretation of the statute . . . as long as the agency's interpretation is
reasonable and based on a permissible construction of the statute."' (quoting Craven Reg'!
Med. Auth. v. N.C. Dep't ofHealth & Human Servs., 625 S.E.2d 837, 844 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006)).
12. WASCO LLC v. N.C. Dep't ofEnv't & Nat. Res., 799 S.E.2d 405, 409 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2017) ("[T]his Court has stated that "an agency's interpretation ofits own regulations
will be enforced unless clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation's plain language."
(quoting Hilliard v. N.C. Dep't ofCorr., 620 S.E.2d 14, 17 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)).
13. F. Andrew Hessick, Remedial Chevron, 97 N.C. L. REv. 1, 7 (2018) ("When the tools
ofstatutory interpretation run out, the resolution ofambiguity in a statute is no longer simply
a legal question. Rather, interpreting the statute also calls for value-laden judgments.").
14. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (stating that
resolving ambiguity in statutory text is a policy question, and sensitivity to the policy
interpretations ofagencies whose job it is to make policy decisions is proper).
15. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(stating that lack ofjudicial expertise is a primary reason for deference).
16. See Hessick, supra note 14, at 7 (listing additional advantages).
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A second pragmatic driver of deference is uniformity. 17 While agency
interpretations are nationwide or statewide, the decisions of lower courts are
not. 18 The United States Supreme Court is the only body that can truly obtain
uniformity, but requiring the Court to resolve disagreements on the meaning
of thousands of administrative statutes could overload its docket. 19
Deference ameliorates the problem because it prevents lower courts from
disagreeing with agency interpretations.
These pragmatic considerations are good reasons for courts to defer
strongly to agency interpretations, but they are not sufficient reasons to be
bound by the interpretations of the agency. 20 What if the agency's
interpretation is not the product of expertise? What if the agency is not
coordinating across statutes? What if the agency itself has adopted
inconsistent interpretations of similar statutes? The point of judicial review;
after all, is to be a check on agency action. 21 If an agency is not doing what
it is supposed to be doing, then wouldn't that be a good reason to second
guess the agency instead of blindly accepting its interpretation?
It should come as no surprise then that from the outset, there have been
lots of critics of the federal binding deference doctrines. 22 In recent years,
the complaints have intensified. There are a handful of Justices on the United
States . Supreme Court who have said that they would overturn the

17. See Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the
Architecture a/Chevron, 42 WM.& MARYL.REv.1105, 1115(2000)("[J]udicial acceptance
of agency legal interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms will promote uniformity in
interpretation ....").
18. See }'.eter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources/or Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM.L.REv.
1093, 1122 (1987) ("[H]aving courts in [different states or districts] ...accept the
[a]drninistrator's "reasonable " judgments about statutory meaning [will] make it more likely
that the statute will have the same effective meaning in each circuit.").
19. See id. at I 098--99, 1133 (highlighting the enormous growth of cases heard before
federal courts compared to the relatively small number ofcases that the United States Supreme
Court is capable of hearing each year).
20. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514 (1989) ("Ifit is, as we have always believed, the constitutional duty
ofthe courts to say what the law is, we must search for something beyond relative competence
as a basis for ignoring that principle when agency action is at issue.").
21. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM.L.REV.
2071, 2086(1990)("[T]he text and background ofthe AP A suggest a firm beliefin the need
for judicial checks on administration, particularly with respect to the interpretation oflaw.").
22. See VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P .COLE, CONG.RESEARCH SERV., LSB10204,
DEFERENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: WILL THE SUPREME COURT OVERRULE CHEVROJ/l 2(2018)
("[T]he Chevron framework has long been subject to criticism ....").

2019]

THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE

425

doctrines, 23 and the attacks against Auer deference have even more support
than those against Chevron. 24 This Term, the Court has decided to reconsider
Auer. 25 We should pay attention to it, not only because of the gravitational
force offederal law, but also because the federal deference schemes apply in
state court when federal law is at issue. 26
II.
The case before the United States Supreme Court that directly
implicates Auer is Kisor v. Wilkie. 27 James Kisor is a veteran who fought in
Vietnam, and has Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of his
experiences there. 28 Because of his PTSD, Kisor receives disability
benefits-but he has only received them since 2006. 29 Kisor wants unpaid
benefits for suffering from PTSD prior to 2006. 30 To be awarded the benefits
retroactively, he had to provide to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
records that were "relevant" in establishing that he had PTSD before 2006. 31
In an effort to show he had PTSD prior to 2006, Kisor gave documents to the
VA showing that he was in combat in Vietnam. 32
The whole case turns on what the word "relevant" means. The usual
legal definition ofrelevance-the one that we teach in evidence-is anything
that tends to prove or disprove a fact ofconsequence. 33 Under that definition,
Kisor's documents are relevant because being in combat tends to make it
more likely that one suffers PTSD. 34 Not dispositive, but more likely.
The VA did not follow the usual legal definition, but instead adopted a
narrower one. 35 The VA's definition of a relevant document was that it had
23. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting SeminoleRock, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 87,
91 n.23, 100--01 nn.92-94 (2018) (noting opinions by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and
Roberts); see also Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120-21 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (criticizing Chevron).
24. For example, although he recently supported Chevron, Justice Alito has voiced
criticism ofAuer deference. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2121-29 (Alito, J., dissenting); Perez
v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210-13 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
25. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (Dec. 10, 2018) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari).
26. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1099-100.
27. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 657 (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
28. SeeBriefforRespondent at 7-8, Kisorv. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (No. 18-15).
29. Id. at 8-9.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Brieffor Petitioner at 17, Kisorv. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (No. 18-15).
33. FED.R. Evm. 401.
34. See Brieffor Petitioner, supra note 33, at 17.
35. Id. at 18; BriefforRespondent, supra note 29, at 9.
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to more specifically contain a diagnosis that supported the claim.36 The VA
said that Kisor's combat records weren't relevant because they didn't
specifically say that Kisor had PTSD, and the VA therefore denied Kisor's
claim.37 The government will win with Auer deference; it might not without
it.38
III.
There are two arguments against Auer and Chevron deference. One
argument is a constitutional; the other is a statutory. The constitutional
argument turns on Article III, which provides that the "judicial
[p]ower ... shall be vested in " the federal courts.39 Some commentators
most notably Justices Thomas and Gorsuch-have made a historical
argument that this judicial power includes the power to interpret the law
independently.40 As Justice Thomas put it, "[T]he judicial power, as
originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment
in interpreting and expounding upon the laws."41
Various sources in the eighteenth century support this view. An
example is the 1770 edition of Mathew Bacon's digest, which says that
"[e]very question oflaw ... is to be tried by the court," and that "it is the
province ofthe justices to determine what the meaning ofa word or sentence
in an act ofparliament is. " 42 This language suggests that it is the job of the
courts to determine the meaning ofstatutes,and that they accordingly should
not defer to the interpretations ofothers. Language similar to that used by
Bacon found its way via The Federalist Papers into Marbury v. Madison,
where the Court said "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."43 From this line, up until the

36. See supra note 36.
37. See supra note 36.
38. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 11 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 1Sa,
Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The Court of Appeals determined
the word "relevant" was ambiguous under the Seminole Rock standard, leaving the only
remaining question to be whether the VA's interpretation was plainly erroneous, which the
court found it was not. Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1368.
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § l.
40. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149--58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
41. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
42. S MATHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 217 (London, J. Worrall & Co.
3d corr. ed. 1770).
43. Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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1930s, the Court consistently held that courts could not defer to agency
interpretations. 44
I do not foresee this constitutional argument getting much traction this
Term. The Court has only two obviously committed originalists-Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch. Justice Kavanaugh might fall into that camp too, but
we don't know yet. 45 Even if Justice Kavanaugh is an originalist, his
addition makes only three Justices who would support the originalist
argument for overturning Auer. The other conservative Justices are not
going to simply follow suit: Justice Alito is very much not an originalist, nor
is Chief Justice Roberts. 46 Justice Alito and the Chief Justice might think
Chevron and Auer are bad ideas, but I doubt they are ready to declare them
unconstitutional. And the more liberal Justices are also not likely to adopt
this originalism argument. After all, they are not committed originalists. 47
They do not think that they should be confined to the eighteenth century
understanding of the Constitution when interpreting it.
In this light, it is unsurprising that the parties in Kisor haven't even
made the originalist argument. 48 They have focused mostly on the statutory
argument. 49 They have also half-heartedly devoted a page or two to a
different constitutional argument-that separation of powers prohibits the
same entity from both writing regulations and interpreting them. 50 But they
have not pressed the originalist argument.
44. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 98 (Max Farrand ed. 1911)
(statement of Rufus King) ("Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come
before them . . . ."); see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating that the "judicial power" entails independent determinations of legal questions); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed. 2008)
("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts."). See
generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 507, 508 (2008) (explaining that
courts historically exercised independent judgment in interpretation); F. Andrew
Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article Ill Courts, 71 VAND. L. REv. 715,
722-24 (2018) (discussing this line of precedent).
45. Robert Keren, Law Professors Debate 'Courts in the Age of Trump,' MIDDLEBURY:
NEWSROOM (Oct. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/2AVV-GUEK (quoting Professor Fleming as
saying "Kavanaugh is no more originalist than [Chief Justice John] Roberts or [Justice
Samuel] Alito." (alteration in original)).
46. Josh Blackman, SCOTUS After Scalia, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 48, 112 (2017)
(stating that "Roberts and Alito[) 'aren't originalists of the same stripe "' as the other
conservative justices (citation omitted)).
47. Eric Posner, Why Originalism Will Fade, ERIC POSNER: BLOG (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://perma.cc/4U5V-RZW4 (stating that the more liberal justices on the Court "don't care
about originalism").
48. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 21-25.
49. Id. at 26-33.
50. Id. at 43-45.
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IV.

The statutory argument contends that Auer deference violates the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 706 ofthe APA, which is the
provision for judicial review, provides that a "reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions oflaw" and "interpret ...statutory provisions."51 That
sounds awfully like courts should not defer to agency interpretations-it's
hard to imagine a clearer way to say that courts should decide legal questions
for themselves. Herculean efforts have been made to say that this is not what
the statute means, 52 but they've come up pretty short.53 The history leading
up to the APA suggests that the drafters perhaps thought that courts should
give weight to agency interpretations-but not that they should treat them as
binding.54
For its part, the Court has concluded that Chevron is consistent with the
APA by saying that the law itself requires courts to defer to agency
interpretations. 55 The Court has stated that each organic statute conferring
rulemaking and adjudicatory authority on agencies includes an implicit
provision which states that the courts are bound by reasonable interpretations
rendered by the agency.56 This is the first point where Auer critics find a
difference between Chevron and Auer. The critics say that, even though we
might read statutes to confer authority on agencies to interpret statutes, there
is no law that says agencies have the authority to interpret their own rules.57
This theory is a bad argument on both scores. First, it is a bad
justification for Chevron because it is obviously a fiction.58 Members of
51. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (2012).
52. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 29-31) (arguing that Chevron is consistent with the APA).
53. The two strongest arguments that the APA permits Chevron review come from
Professor Sunstein and Dean Manning. See John Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM.L.REV.612, 635
n.123 (1996); Chevron as Law, supra note 53, at 29--31. They argue that the pre-APA
historical backdrop against which the APA was enacted supports deference. But that
historical practice cannot easily overcome the text of the APA and the Attorney General's
Committee majority report leading to the APA, both of which indicate independent judicial
review. See FINAL REP. OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, s. Doc.No.77-8 at 75-96 (1st Sess.1941).
54. See Chevron as Law, supra note 53, at 27-32.
55. See Smiley v. Citibank ( South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740--41 (1996) ("We
accord deference to agencies under Chevron ...because of a presumption that Congress,
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that
the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency ....").
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 33-36.
58. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review a/Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.L.REv.
363 , 370 (1986) (acknowledging that this argument rests on a "legal fiction").
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Congress ordinarily do not think one way or the other about judicial review
of agency interpretations (though their staffers might). 59 More importantly,
Chevron deference is given to interpretations of statutes enacted before the
Chevron decision, and Congress could not have prognosticated the doctrine.
60

Second, the argument does not provide a principled way of
distinguishing Auer. If Chevron is a fiction, why not create a fiction for
Auer? We could equally imagine a fiction under which Congress says that
agencies can both write regulations and dispositively resolve any ambiguities
in those regulations. Indeed, the Court has essentially recognized this point,
stating that the "power" for an agency "authoritatively to interpret its own
regulations is a component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers." 61
There may be an inclination to say that if Chevron and Auer are fictions,
we should get rid of them. Maybe we should, but there is stare decisis. Stare
decisis is strong in the interpretation of statutes because Congress can fix the
problem. 62 That is sometimes a silly justification because Congress
generally does not pay attention to court decisions. But here, deference is a
big enough deal that it's probably been on Congress's radar, and Congress
has not overturned it. 63
Still, stare decisis isn't absolute. 64 It can be overcome when
maintaining the precedent is poorly reasoned or leads to bad consequences.65
The main argument against stare decisis for Auer is that Auer lets agencies
game the system. The theory goes as follows: Normally, agencies only get
59. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN.

L. REv. 901, 996-97 (2013) (reporting from an empirical study on Congress that "decisions
to leave statutory terms ambiguous are typically made without regard to whether the courts
will later defer to an agency interpretation").
60. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2091-104.
61. Martin v.Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).
62. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 23 (2005) (stating that precedent has a
particularly ''powerful" pull in the context of "settled statutory meaning" because "Congress
remains free to alter what [the courts] have done." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63. Professor Kozel has made the intriguing argument that Chevron and Auer should be
seen as doctrines of statutory interpretation, which traditionally do not receive stare decisis
effect. Randy J.Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of
Stare Decisis, TEXAS L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 160-65) (available at
https://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=3312818). The Court, however, has not
viewed those doctrines this way. Perez v.Mortg. BankersAss'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1214 n.1
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he Court has appeared to treat our
agency deference regimes as precedents entitled to stare decisis effect ....").
64. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (" Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command ...." (emphasis omitted)).
65. See id. at 827.
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Chevron deference for rules when they go through notice and comment,
which is a long and expensive process. 66 For Auer deference, agencies don't
have to do that. Auer deference applies to an interpretation that an agency
renders in any document-not just interpretations that are the product of
notice and comment. 67 If an agency issues an interpretive rule without notice
and comment or renders an interpretation in a letter, amicus brief, or
somewhere else, the agency's interpretation potentially gets Auer
deference. 68 This means that an agency can minimize notice and comment
costs by going through notice and comment only once, and writing
ambiguous, broad rules. 69 As a result, agencies can set the meaning of the
rules through interpretations that get Auer deference.
This problem appears to be more theoretical than actual. 70 Often,
agencies do not want to preserve discretion for future heads of their agencies;
they want to limit their successors' discretion. 71 That's because agency
heads want to preserve the rules that they write. For example, I doubt that
Obama's Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) wanted to maintain
discretion for Trump's EPA to roll back the clean power rules. Therefore,
agencies probably do not want to write broad ambiguous rules, but rather
narrow precise ones, and that prevents the Auer deference problem.
66. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) ("[A]dministrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority. Delegation ofsuch authority may be shown in a variety ofways,
as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking ....").
67. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council,Inc. v.U. S. Dep't ofTransp .,770 F.3d 1260,1270
(9th Cir. 2014) ("We afford Auer deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations regardless of whether that interpretation was adopted through notice-and
comment rulemaking.").
68. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (providing Auer
deference in adjudication ofregulation); Gardebring v.Jenkins,485 U.S.415,429-30 (1988)
(providing Auer deference to position first espoused in amicus brief); Eisai, Inc. v.FDA, 134
F. Supp. 3d 384,394 ( D.D.C. 2015) (providing Auer deference to interpretation in letter).
69. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) ( Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("To expand this domain [ofAuer deference], the agency need only write
substantive rules more broadly and vaguely,leaving plenty ofgaps to be filled in later,using
interpretive rules unchecked by notice and comment.").
70. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U.CHI.
L.REv. 297,308 (2017) ("[W]e are unaware of, and no one has pointed to,any regulation in
American history that, because ofAuer, was designed vaguely and broadly." (footnote
omitted)).
71. Id. at 309 (criticizing this argument against Auer because "[i]f an agency leaves a
regulation ambiguous, it cannot be certain that a subsequent interpretation will be made by an
administration with the same or similar values.").
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Still, agencies sometimes write ambiguous rules. But why do they do
so, given that it gives power to their successors who might hold different
views? One reason is that agencies are not precisely sure how to regulate a
matter. They would rather leave the rule to be clarified through adjudication
on a case-by-case basis, which makes a good deal of sense. Our common
law system operates on the premise that rules should be clarified through
adjudication. 72 Still, this doesn't mean that the agency's interpretation has
to be binding. The same goals of achieving good law can be accomplished
through Skidmore-type deference. 73
It is obviously hard to predict how the Court will rule on this issue.
There are three solid votes against Auer-Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Gorsuch. Justice Kavanaugh will probably also go that way. The remaining
Justices are hard to predict, but I do not think that the Court would have taken
the case-a decision that took four votes74-unless there was a good chance
for a fifth vote.

V.

What happens if the Court does away with Auer-and Chevron?
Regarding Auer, it would not change anything for most matters. Without
Auer, agencies will continue to issue circulars and letters, and they will
continue to render adjudications interpreting their regulations. Those
interpretations would not be formally binding, but courts will give them
weight. Dispensing with Auer is only going to matter when an agency wants
to receive binding deference on its position. When that happens, agencies
will have to go through more formal mechanisms to provide its
interpretation. The easiest, cheapest way of creating binding interpretations
is to proceed by adjudications that interpret organic statutes. 75
Interpretations of statutes rendered in those adjudications do receive
Chevron deference. 76 So in the long run, if the Court tosses Auer but keeps
Chevron, we should expect fewer rules promulgated by notice and comment,
72. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1791, 1806 (2009)

("[C]ommon law courts constructed and clarified legal norms through a case-by-case process
of adjudication .. .. ').
73. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
74. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U. S. 521, 560 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (noting the rule of four). The rule is not codified in Supreme Court
rules, but rather is an informal practice.
See Joshua A.Douglas & Michael E. Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and
the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413,423 n.64 (2019).
75. See Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L. J. 943, 964-72 (2017)
(arguing that adjudication of statutes is the likely substitute for Auer deference).
76. See United States v. Mead Corp.,533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001).
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and more doctrine developed through adjudication. But I don't want to say
that it will be extreme.
And what if the Court overturns Chevron? Doing away with Chevron
might also increase adjudications. Many agencies have the authority to
develop policy through rulemaking and adjudication, 77 and they ordinarily
can pick which device they wish to use. 78 Rules are expensive to
promulgate, 79 and why would an agency bear all those costs if it's not
confident that the court will agree that the law supports the rule?
Adjudications may be cheaper. 80 Agency adjudications would still be
reviewed and courts would not defer to agency interpretations, but because
the cost of the adjudication is lower, it would be less drastic if a court rejected
the agency's interpretation. 81
But, again, the shift towards more adjudications would probably not be
dramatic. Even if Auer and Chevron are overturned, courts will still afford
Skidmore deference. Just as a reminder, Skidmore is the type of deference
applied in the North Carolina courts. 82 It is not binding deference. 83 It is a
pragmatic doctrine under which courts give weight to agency interpretations
and will defer to them when it makes sense to do so. 84 Although Skidmore
77. M.Elizabeth Magill,Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI.L.REv.1383,
1402 (2004) ("Agencies often have the ability to choose among various methods of making
policy while implementing a single statutory provision."). Of course, some agencies do face
restrictions on the methods they can use to develop policy. Some provisions of the Clean Air
Act, for example, require the EPA to develop policy by rulemaking instead of adjudication.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 766l a(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (stating that the EPA shall adopt
regulations to establish "minimum elements of a permit program to be administered by any
air pollution control agency'').
78. See Magill, supra note 78, at 1405 ("The core of the principle that an agency is free
to choose its policymaking form was established long ago ....").
79. Zachary J.F. Kolodin, Standing to Challenge Regulatory Failure in the Age of
Preemption, 22 N.Y.U.ENVTL.L.J.157, 165 (2015) ("Notice and comment regulation is very
costly to undertake ....").
80. Johnny C.Burris, Symposium, The Failure of the Florida Judicial Review Process
to Provide Effective Incentives forAgency Rulemaking, 18 FLA. ST. U.L.REV. 661,671 (1991)
("[A]dministrative agencies also believe that it is much cheaper to develop public policy
through adjudication rather than rulemaking.").
81. Even under today's Chevron regime, the relative inexpensiveness of adjudication
leads some agencies to formulate policy through adjudication instead of rulemaking. See
Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE
L.J. 274, 274 (1991) ("Despite having been granted both rulemaking and adjudicatory power
in its statutory charter more than half a century ago, the [NLRB] has chosen to formulate
policy almost exclusively through the process of adjudication." (footnotes omitted)).
82. See supra notes 9-17.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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is not binding, the abandonment of Auer and Chevron could very well lead
courts to treat Skidmore as essentially binding deference. Thus, although
courts might not be obligated to defer to agency interpretations rendered in
rule or adjudications if Auer and Chevron are overturned, courts still often
will-at least for the foreseeable future. One reason is that binding deference
is what judges are used to and already know. Another reason is that
interpretations of regulatory provisions are policy laden. There's a pretty
strong ethos today that judges shouldn't make policy decisions; 85 they should
let policymakers do it. 86 Judicial deference to agency interpretations results
in policymakers making the policy choices; de novo review does not. 87 None
of this is to say that judges will always defer. They will not. Rather, it is to
suggest only that deference will still be very common.
Still, over time, if the Court were to stay committed to a course against
binding deference, we should expect an increasing willingness by the courts
to disagree with agency interpretations, as the memories of the old practice
disappear and as judges simply become more accustomed to the role of
making policy by not deferring. This process would likely track what
happened with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. First created in 1984, the
Guidelines were binding until 2005, when the Court held that the Guidelines
were only advisory. 88 Although the Guidelines are no longer binding,
sentencing judges continue to sentence within the Guidelines to a good
degree. 89 Judges presumably continue to use the Sentencing Guidelines
because that's what they are used to, and because the sentencing commission

85. Phillip Dane Warren, The Impact of Weakening Chevron Deference on
Environmental Deregulation, 118 COLUM. L. REv. ONLINE 62, 65 (2018) (noting the

continuing weight of the notion that the role of courts is to "say what the law is." (citation
omitted)).
86. Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce
Clause, 74 Tux. L. REv. 719, 769 (1996) ("If representative self-government is the
norm, policy judgments are for electorally responsible officials, not judges.").
87. Kathryn M. Baldwin, Note, Endangered Deference: Separation of Powers and
Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation, 92 ST.JOHN'S L.REV.91, 108 (2018) ("Rather than
defer to agency decisions, judges make policy choices in de novo review."); Michael Ray
Harris, Breaking the Grip of the Administrative Triad: Agency Policy Making Under A
Necessity-Based Doctrine, 86 TuL. L. REv. 273, 275 (2011) ("Judicial oversight of agency
policy making, however, is by definition not de novo, but must come with some measure of
deference to the agency ....").
88. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 241 (2005) ("The ...approach, which we
now adopt, would ...make the Guidelines system advisory ....").
89. Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing After Booker, CRJME AND JUSTICE (forthcoming)
available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/701712?mobileUi=O&
(reporting only a 10% drop of within guidelines sentences following Booker).
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is the expert. But, in the last few years, judges have been more willing to
stray from the Guidelines."
There is another consequence of abandoning Chevron that's important
to highlight. Even if courts uphold agency interpretations at the same rate
under the two types of deference, the consequence of doing so would be
different. The theory of Chevron is that agencies have been delegated
interpretive authority. When courts defer under these doctrines, they do not
''say what the law is"; they simply evaluate whether the agency properly
exercised its delegated power.9 1 This means that agencies are not stuck with
one interpretation; they can switch their interpretations so long as the
92
interpretation is reasonable.
But under a regime of Skidmore deference, courts do give their own
interpretation. They give weight to the agency's interpretation, but they are
not bound by it. Therefore, courts in North Carolina are the ultimate arbiters
of the meaning of a statute. An agency's views are relevant only in helping
the court determine what a statute means. Thus in North Carolina, a court's
interpretation actually does set the agency's law. Agencies accordingly have
significantly less leeway in changing interpretations that have been upheld
by the courts. The decision that upholds the interpretation of the statute
should set that interpretation as the law.
If the federal courts abandon Chevron and follow the North Carolina
approach, the initial interpretation of a rule rendered by an agency potentially
becomes more important. A court reviewing that agency interpretation will
defer to it, but in doing so will make the agency's view the law. Future
employees of that agency will be significantly constrained in deviating from
that interpretation. In other words, whoever is in charge when a law is first
interpreted and challenged will have much more influence over the content
of that law.

90. Id.
91. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,98284 (2005); Warren, supra note 86 (citation omitted).
92. Sec'y of Labor v. Nat'l Cement Co. of Cal., 573 F.3d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
("A change in interpretation, however, is no reason to withhold Chevron deference provided
the agency explained the basis for its reconsidered view.").

